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S.-China Relations: View From Each Side

ing Is Dubious
out Substantial
Improvements

FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

NG KONG, Nov. 29—

President Ford arrives
ing Monday. He will en-
a Chinese leadership
s more dubious about,
disappointed with, its
ns with the United States
at any time since Pres-
Nixon's epochal visit
years ago.

Chinese have no illusions
Mr. Ford's already-short-
four-day trip will lead
substantial improvements.

Like Mr. Nixon, who dealt
the urbane, sophisticated
Minister, Chou En-Lai,
Ford will find a new nego-
g partner, Teng Hsiao-
the blunt, tough senior
Prime Minister.

ine last few months, with
Chou seriously ill and
man Mao Tse-tung, in
onable health, Mr. Teng
merged as the functioning

. Moving rapidly, he has
ed a surprisingly large
er of his long-time sup-
ers in key posts, many of
like himself, rehabilitated

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Washington Senses a Loss of Leverage Against Soviet

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 29—

President Ford and Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger
have left for China to try to
preserve what remains of the
Peking-Washington relation-
ship and the leverage on the
Soviet Union that it provides.

Mr. Kissinger and other high
Administration officials have
acknowledged privately that
whatever leverage Washington
has derived—and this is a mat-
ter of serious discussion—it
is much weaker today.

Mr. Kissinger is said to attri-
bute the decline to Peking's
view of the United States as
lacking international resolve
and Moscow's view of the Ad-
ministration as impotent in the
face of Congressional opposi-
tion. Also, in his assessment,
Moscow's fear of Chinese-
American collusion has dimin-
ished.

While other officials disagree
with Mr. Kissinger's analysis,
all those interviewed did agree
on implications of the decline:
that what was once a center-

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Washington Fears Losing Leverage Against Moscow

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

that current Soviet adventur-
ism in Portugal and Angola
can be traced in part to the
slippage in Chinese-American
relations.

In sum, Mr. Kissinger and
his aides believe that the devel-
oping Chinese-American ties
provided the decisive element
in Moscow's debate on détente
on top of its desire for equal
status with Washington, for
avoiding or mitigating nuclear
war and for gaining American
financial and technological aid.

Soviet leaders and high Ad-
ministration officials have
come to see that the very factor
that caused Peking and Wash-
ington to re-establish contact—
their conflicts with Moscow—is
now a source of tension.

Kissinger and Chamberlain
The Chinese leaders have lost
no opportunity to equate Mr.
Kissinger's policy of improved
relations with Moscow with Ne-
ville Chamberlain's policy of
appeasement of Hitler. Mr. Kis-
singer has responded on many
occasions, as he did in Detroit
the other day, that the United
States will continue to resist
expansionism but that it will
avoid needless confrontations.

To underline the point that
the Administration will not sac-
rifice détente to Chinese-
American relations, Mr. Kissin-
ger added in Detroit that the
policies of each nation "are
not subject to the instruction
of the other."

Privately Mr. Kissinger insists
that the Chinese are at least
as eager as he is for President
Ford's visit. Whatever the dif-
ferences over détente, it is said,
neither side wants the relation-
ship to collapse.

The officials note that Mr.
Kissinger has developed with
Peking some related, indirect
common points of influence
against Moscow. The Chinese
have been brought around to
supporting the security treaty
between the United States and
Japan, thereby reducing its di-
visiveness in Japanese politics.
They have been led to urge
West European leaders to main-
tain their military strength
against the Soviet Union, as
the Administration has been
pressing them to do for many
years.

Moreover, he has argued that
the opening to China was an
important factor in moderating
the Russians' behavior else-
where—their role in the Middle
East notwithstanding — and
trip to Peking is necessary

to decide that the United
States is a power to be reck-
oned with before they seek
further improvement in rela-
tions. He is also said to be
waiting for the Soviet leaders
to feel confident that they can
enter new agreements that
Congress will not overturn.

A few officials believe that
Mr. Kissinger has always over-
rated the opening to China as
a means of extracting conces-
sions from the Soviet Union.
Like some of Mr. Kissinger's
aides, these officials distin-
guished between the leverage
Washington had by virtue of
the Chinese-Soviet split and
the leverage accrued from di-
rect dealings with Peking.

They noted that Moscow was
disposed to negotiate on limita-
tions on strategic arms and
American export credits in
1967 and 1968, well before Mr.
Kissinger's secret journey to
Peking, which came in 1971.
They maintained that the flurry
of Soviet-American accords in
1972 and 1973—on nuclear
arms, export credits and grain
sales—were all highly advan-
tageous to the Russians, so
much so that they would have
made them in the absence of
the United States-Chinese ar-
rangements.

The officials, citing the ex-
ample of the Berlin accord of
late 1971, contended that Mos-
cow was influenced to com-
promise by the prospect of
gaining recognition for East
Germany and improving rela-
tions with West Germany.

A Confusion Discerned
In sum, the officials believe
that Mr. Kissinger looked at
the coincidence of the relations
with China and the accords
with the Soviet Union and con-
fused simultaneity with cause
and effect.

On the other hand, the Secre-
tary of State has maintained
that it was more than mere
coincidence that within weeks
of the announcement of his
secret trip to China President
Nixon was invited to Moscow.
The ice was broken on the
Berlin negotiations and the first
nuclear-arms pact took final
shape.

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